ABSTRACT
Introduction
Auctions have become very popular mechanisms among policy-makers worldwide as a way to allocate public resources. Economic theory suggests that auctions offer many advantages. Under what seem to be mild conditions, auctions ensure the efficient allocation of goods and raise substantial revenues for the public purse.
They also offer a source of information that policymakers may be able to exploit in implementing other policy goals. For example, a major goal of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations conducted by the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was the elimination of so-called non-tariff barriers to trade. In the case of quantitative restrictions in sectors such as agriculture, reform is to take place in two separate phases.
The first phase involves the replacement of quota policies with tariff policies that have similar effects. The second phase then works to reduce the tariffs. The justification for the two-stage trade reform has been that immediate removal of restrictions may cause great domestic disruption. The success of the GATT in achieving tariff-reduction argues for the initial change to a tariff-based policy. 1 Throughout the 1980's, New Zealand employed auctions to distribute the rights to import products from abroad. The data from these quota license auctions provide an opportunity to test the validity of the presumed advantages of auctions. Quota rights were auctioned yearly or half-yearly for ten years. The rights were tradable and, indeed, an active secondary market developed. The presence of the secondary markets raises issues that are the focus of this paper and relate directly to three main functions of an auction mechanism. First, the simple fact that retrade occurred suggests that the auctions by themselves were not successful in generating an ex post efficient allocation. Second, the secondary markets also provide data that help to test the revenue raising role of auctions. We illustrate that resale prices for the quota rights tend to be substantially higher than the auction prices. This fact suggests that some potential revenues were foregone by the government authorities and accrued instead to the participants in the auctions. Finally, the fact that the auction prices tended to be below the ex post market value of the quota also places into doubt the informational role of the auctions. For some environments, the auction prices provide tight estimates for the range of the tariff equivalent. However, these same conditions suggest that resale prices and auctions prices should be similar. The fact that resale prices tend actually to be higher suggests that either the auctions understate the true tariff equivalent or that the resale prices are substantial overestimates of the equivalent.
In the next section, we construct a simple model of auctions with resale. In Section 3, we show that quota auctions can serve an important informational role. The mean of the equilibrium prices determined at these auctions bound the mean of the tariff equivalent for the product for which the quota license is offered.
In Section 4, we describe more fully the New Zealand auctions and the data they generated. In Section 5, we compute the bounds implied by the theoretical analysis. We then use subsequent secondary market prices for these quota licenses as proxies for the true value of the license and show that the auction prices tend to fall below these values. This phenomenon both suggests a rejection of the theoretical predictions and indicates the presence of some surprisingly high arbitrage possibilities.
The auctions in the theoretical section are idealizations of the true institutions. In Section 6, we examine various alternative explanations for the deviation of auction prices and resale prices. An important departure from reality is our assumption, in the theory, that bidders desire to purchase fixed and identical quantities and they may submit bids only in single units. In fact, as in many auctions, bidders were able to submit bid schedules and often purchased quite a variety of quantities. Little is currently known about equilibria of auctions of this form. However, it is known that, in auctions in which bidders may have different marginal valuations for different quantities, incentives develop for bidders to reduce their stated demands (Ausubel and Cramton, 1996) . The failure to predict accurately the relationship between auction prices and resale prices may be due to the fact that most bidders desire multiple units and are able to bid for them.
However, we do not find strong evidence to indicate that multiple unit bidding is at fault. Neither is there strong evidence to indicate that the common value component introduced by a secondary market is responsible. We provide a series of regressions that illustrates the correlation between the deviation of aftermarket prices and 4 auctions prices and various proxies for the aftermarket and multiple unit effects. We conclude tentatively that speculative purchases at auction followed by opportunistic pricing in the aftermarket led to higher than competitive aftermarket prices.
The model
Fix a particular good for which quota rights are sold at auction. For a given auction, t, there are n t bidders each desiring a single unit of the q t objects up for auction. We assume that the bidders may demand at most one unit primarily because little is known in auctions where bidders may choose the quantities they demand as well as the prices they submit. This assumption may be a significant one and its role is examined further in Section 6.
For bidder, i, the value of the right to import a unit of a good is given by
where p d t and p w t are the realized domestic and world prices for the product in period t and c i t is the cost of bringing the product to the domestic market and distributing it. As is suggested by the subscripts, it is reasonable to expect that all firms in a given market care similarly about the world and domestic prices while the cost of distributing the good enters only their utility. 2 For each auction a random vector, (z t ,x t ), which affects the valuation of the quota right is realized before the auction is held. The component z t is publicly observed. It reflects information about the realization of world and domestic prices and may also contain auction specific information such as the number of licenses for sale and the number of bidders at the auction.
The component x t = (x 1 t ,...,x t n t ) comprises the private information of each bidder, i = 1,2,...n t , about his true costs. Throughout the paper, we assume x i t is a single dimensional real number. We also assume that all random variables are independent across periods and that bidders in any given auction play the one-shot Nash equilibrium. These assumptions remove informational or strategic links across auctions. Except where necessary for clarity, we drop the superscript t in what follows. the good profitably in that year. In this sense, any such J would mimic the effects of the quota regime. We ignore the relatively inconsequential multiplicity that is implied by the fact that U (q+1) < U (q) since any selection from that interval would have the same economic effects. More problematic from a policymaker's perspective is the fact that from year to year this interval varies randomly. The tariff equivalent is a random variable. We focus on the information that auctioning of quota rights over time provides about the distribution of this random variable.
The randomness of the underlying market makes each bidder's private information of value to themselves, to other participants in the auction and to a policymaker who may wish to use this information to glean a better idea of the tariff equivalent. The nature of the private information that the bidders enjoy will have consequences for their bidding behavior and for the information that the bids reveal. The possibility of retrade on a secondary market makes it important to be explicit about timing. We assume that bidders' signals, x i , are learned before the auction takes place. The true values, U i , are realized at some point after the auction. Since the initial information may only yield imprecise signals about the true valuations, it is possible that after the final resolution of uncertainty there remains an incentive to reallocate the licenses. It is this incentive that motivates the secondary markets.
We assume that once the true values are realized they become public knowledge and that only the bidders in the original auctions participate as end users in the secondary markets. The first assumption rules out the possibility of strategic behavior in auctions geared toward affecting subsequent prices on resale. The 6 second assumption appears to be borne out by the information we have concerning the secondary markets.
3 If the resale prices do, in fact, represent the true value of the quota licenses, then the price will lie somewhere between U (q) and U (q+1) when there are q licenses available. Reflecting the assumption that the secondary markets are competitive, throughout the remainder of the paper, we assume that retrade occurs at a price which yields the q+1'st highest valuer exactly zero surplus.
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This characterization of the behavior of the secondary markets is a simplification of the approach used by Haile (1996) . He does not assume that the final values are public knowledge and allows for strategic behavior in the secondary market as well. This, in turn, generates an additional strategic effect in the auction stage that is reminiscent of the ratchet effect (Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole, 1985) . In Haile's analysis, this effect raises bids. However, the direction of that effect appears to be a consequence of the way the secondary market game is modeled and, in general, higher or lower bids are possible. This indeterminacy, the large number of bidders and the desire for tractability serve as the rationale for ignoring this "ratchet" effect here.
Let dF s (C*r) denote the density of a random variable s conditional on a realization of event r. We make the following assumptions about the joint distributions of the various random variables:
(C1) All bidders share the same information, z.
(C2) Given z, for any j … i, and for any x i and x j , U i and U j are statistically independent. If x i = x j , U i and U j have the same conditional distribution.
(C3) Given z, for any j…i, x i and x j are distributed independently and identically and have strictly positive densities over a compact, convex support which we set to be [0, 1] .
(C4) For any i, given z, let the density of U i conditional on x i be , defined over the unit interval,
is assumed to be strictly positive and to satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio
condition: In keeping with the interpretation of x i as a signal of the final value of U i through its information about costs, x i and U i are assumed to be jointly distributed (Assumption (C4)). The assumptions also imply that i's
While the model is special, it is not unreasonably restrictive. The secondary market introduces a source of a common value in a very natural way. The fact that all bidders care equally about potentially random world and domestic prices does not on its own generate an affiliated values model in the sense of Milgrom and Weber (1982) as long as bidders have similar access to whatever information there is concerning the realization of world and domestic prices. As long as bidders all share the same imperfect information about future prices, this source of uncertainty will merely shift all bids accordingly to take the information into account. Since this information plays no distinctive role in the analysis of strategic behavior, we ignore it in the theoretical analysis. Its relevance arises for the empirical analysis since it explains variation across auctions of different goods and at different times.
3.Equilibrium bidding behavior in discriminatory auctions
In our theoretical version of New Zealand's discriminatory price auction, bidders submit bids for single units of the good simultaneously and the top q bidders obtain the object. Winners pay the price they bid and the payment is made immediately.
Fix a bidder, i and define the function, w(@,@) by
The combination of the monotone likelihood condition and independence implies that w(@,@) is increasing in both its arguments. The following result will prove useful.
Proof: See Appendix A.
where is the cumulative distribution function of the q th highest of the signals of the n-1 other bidders
and is its associated density function.
signal. The next result is an adaptation of standard proofs (see for example, Milgrom and Weber, 1982) . 
Revenue equivalence follows because the right side represents the expected average price paid in the discriminatory auction. Theorem 3 now can be used to derive bounds for the tariff equivalent in the New Zealand discriminatory auctions.
Theorem 4: The expected value of the average winning bids in the q-unit discriminatory auction is less than or equal to the expected value of U (q+1) .
Theorem 4 provides a lower bound on the tariff equivalent in the case of discriminatory auctions. The lack of a simple upper bound stems from the common value component that the secondary markets introduce.
For some common value auctions, it is possible that all higher bids lie below the tariff equivalent. However, the source of the common value is of a special kind in this environment and an upper bound for the tariff equivalent is available if an additional assumption is made. The next result indicates that if the link between initial signals and final valuations is strong enough, then we can derive an upper bound in each auction.
Holding the distribution of the U i 's fixed, consider a sequence of environments, m = 1,2,..., specifying a progressively stronger relationship between signals X i and valuations, U i , such that
where Prob m
[A#B] is probability of event A given event B for environment m.
Theorem 5: For a sequence of environments m = 1,2,.. satisfying (C5),
The limiting hypothesis of the theorem considers environments in which the initial signal about the object's true value becomes more accurate. In the limit, there is no randomness following the auction and, so, no motivation for retrade. In our data set, conditional on a secondary market transaction occurring, the average quantity transacted was only 6 percent of the total quantity sold. Since we record only secondary sales of one retrader, this figure is only a lower bound on the total sales so we cannot say very much about the overall frequency of recourse to the secondary market. On the assumption that their overall use remained relatively small, Theorem 5 implies that the expectation of the average of the highest winning bids excluding the marginal winning bid exceeds the expectation of the tariff-equivalent. We use this result to construct a testable conjecture concerning an upper bound on the tariff-equivalent.
Auction data and institutions in New Zealand
New Zealand auctioned the rights to import restricted products from 1981 to 1991. Licenses could be traded and, indeed, they had an active resale market in import quota licenses. The model indicates that the aftermarket has two important economic effects. First, it introduces the possibility of a common value element into the environment even if none were present initially, for bidders now have the opportunity to purchase a license ex post at a common market price that is unknown at the time of the auction. Second, resale prices themselves provide a basis for estimating the value of the licenses, and the tariff-equivalent.
The New Zealand government auctioned import quota rights for over 400 quite specific categories of goods, including such disparate items as underwater spear guns and meat offal. The auction system was initially intended to serve the purpose of information gathering, a so-called tariff-testing mechanism for the process of tariffication. Although the auction bids were not used to develop tariff equivalents, they often influenced the transition out of quotas since categories with very low bids were typically liberalized first. New
Zealand abolished all licensing arrangements by 1992. Auctions were held yearly or half-yearly. Sealed bids were invited for submission within two months of the announcement of the auction. The licenses were generally available for use soon after the auction. Any resident firm or person was eligible to participate. 5 Only prospective bidders who had previously defaulted were technically barred from participation in the auction, but even this limitation was not actually enforced. For most of the licenses, a unit of the quota represented the right to import $NZ 2,000 of a given good. Until 1988, licenses were valid for one year. After 1988, the expiration date on licenses was eliminated. Bids were submitted in nominal dollar amounts. Thus, the conversion to percentages was easily accomplished by dividing the bid by the value of imports allowed by the license unit. The auction was discriminatory and the discriminatory auction described above fits the institution well, subject to the caveat that bidders could bid on more than one unit. Bids were ordered from highest to lowest. In this way a form of market demand curve was constructed and the intersection of this curve with the quantity of licenses available determined the winners of the licenses. Winners were expected to pay for the license immediately following the auction. 6 Results of the auction were published in the New Zealand Gazette soon after the auction. This publication is the source of our auction data from New Zealand. Because of the amount of work involved, only a subset of categories of goods were transcribed from the Gazette. The data included the date of the auction, the total amount tendered, all bids submitted and quantity asked for, as well as the total number of bidders. what was recorded in the data set at our disposal. However, as can be seen in the average quantities tendered per auction, New Zealand increased the number of licenses offered in the auctions over the last half of the 1980's. Nevertheless, the lowest price paid (in percentage terms) remained fairly high as did the average price paid. This likely reflects the practice of the New Zealand government to eliminate quota restrictions on the products which attracted only low bids in previous auctions. In some years more than one auction per product was held. These are treated as independent auctions. Thus, averages, maximums and minimums are computed across all the auctions in the data set for a given year. (Auctions where there was excess supply --fewer than the total quantity offered were demanded --were dropped from the data set.) The number of winning bids column reports the number of distinct bids submitted. Since many bidders submitted a number of bids at different prices, these values generally exceed the number of bidders. The data is recorded by bid rather than bidder and the size of the data set made it infeasible to determine the number of different bidders per auction for all auctions. However, this number was computed for a subset of the auctions and is reported in Tables 3   and 4 . There it can be seen that each bidder submits, on average, about two bids per auction. The Clearing
Percentage column in Table 1 reports summary data on the lowest winning bid per auction calculated as a percentage of the value of imports.
Theorem 4 shows that the expected value of an average of all winning bids lies below the expected value of the tariff equivalent. Theorem 5 implies that if the link between initial signals and final valuations is strong enough, the expected value of an average of all winning bids excluding the lowest accepted bid lies above it. We adapt these results to allow for multi-unit bids by computing weighted averages of bids, using as the weights the quantity requested per bid. Some bidders submitted multiple bids. By averaging across all winning bids in this way, we effectively treat each distinct bid as coming from a different bidder. We return to this issue in Section 6. 
Secondary market data in New Zealand
There was no formal market for transfers of auctioned import licenses in New Zealand. Auctioned import licenses could be transferred, but until late 1987, import license transfers had to be processed through a government agency. No records of prices and quantities for trades on the secondary market were compiled by government agencies or industry organizations. An informal market, which expanded after 1987, existed among retailers, importers, customs agents and quota brokers. Our source of data for secondary market trades in New Zealand is the written records of Mertz and Associates, one of the major quota brokers in Auckland.
Mertz and Associates, a customs agency primarily serving apparel importers, frequently had to transact in auctioned import licenses on behalf of clients and also participated in the auctions and secondary market on their own account. The data set consists of 1447 secondary market transactions from October, 1987 through September, 1991. It includes information on date of the original auction as well as the date of the secondary market transaction, commodity category, buyer, seller, quantity bought or sold, and price. Despite a search, we could not find any other major quota broker who had preserved records of transactions. Although some products had more than one auction per year, since the data recorded the original auction, we could compute directly the days that elapsed between the auction and the resale. In our data set of secondary market transactions, there were four products with multiple auctions in 1989 and one with multiple auctions in 1990.
In the subsequent regression analysis, these observations are not an issue since we restricted attention to product categories for which resale data was available in all four years and none of these products satisfied that criterion. Table 3 Similarly, the column reporting Gini coefficients of quantities demanded per bid indicates that bidders often bid for varying quantities of licenses.
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In Table 4 , attention is restricted to the 10 product categories for which we have secondary market transaction data in every year. Mertz and Associates dealt mainly in textiles. The product categories we have reflect this. There is some variability across product codes in the frequency at which the secondary market was employed, the average date to transaction and especially in the proportion of the quota sold at auction which was ultimately sold in the aftermarket. process generating the random variables in our data set is assumed to be given by
This specification is very general. We make no assumptions about the distribution of , k t . Its distribution may depend on k and t so we allow for a year and good specific term that affects both the auction prices and secondary market prices similarly. This term could include changing expectations about the world or domestic price. Its mean need not be zero. Table 5 . In case the data generation process we have assumed in the secondary market actually overstates the number of observations at our disposal (for example, if Var[6 kj t ] = 0) the between regressions using the mean secondary market prices are also reported. The true implication, of course, is that the constant should be non-positive, however, in all years, the estimate proves to be significantly positive and so, a fortiori, the implication of Theorem 5 is rejected.
An alternative disaggregation can be done by product code. That is, hold k fixed and run a regression similar to the one above for each product code. There are ten products for which secondary market transactions are available in all four years. The regression results are reported in Table 6 . With the exception of product codes 916, 924 and 935, the implication of Theorem 5 is rejected. For product 924, we cannot reject the null that the constant is zero. For 916, though, the random effects estimate is significantly negative. In fact, by reversing and testing the stronger implication of Theorem 4 that B kj t -b kj t is positive as is done in the line for 916A, we also find a rejection. There is no observable distinction for this product category except the fact that an unusually high proportion of products sold at auction were retraded. This is puzzling since the assumption underlying Theorem 5 suggests that the lower bound will be more easily satisfied the less stable is the initial allocation from the auction.
The whole data set can be utilized by assuming that all the random variables are iid across k and t. The value of the mean difference is 5.7 with a t-statistic of 17.4 implying an easy rejection of the null. Over the whole sample of auctions for which secondary market transactions are available, the sample mean of B k t is 26.0 percent while the sample mean of B is 33 percent. This represents a secondary market premium more than 26%
higher than the weighted bids in the auction suggesting some very tempting arbitrage possibilities!
Discussion
The New Zealand data reject the implication of Theorem 5. What accounts for the deviation between the auction price and the later resale price? A variety of joint hypotheses underlies the theoretical model. In this section, we discuss which of the maintained hypotheses may fail to hold.
One explanation for the failure of the model to predict accurately the relationship between bids and resale prices is the fact that bidders were able to, and did, submit multiple bids. Does the presence of a resale market generate incentives to purchase excess units with the intention of reselling them on the market?
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Consider a simple extension of the model where bidders continue to have use for a single unit but may bid for as many as f units that they can resell on the secondary market. Suppose that q/f = s is a whole number so that 18 winning bidders remain symmetric. Appendix 2 illustrates that in this simple extension, it remains the case that bidders with highest s signals win quotas and employ bids that satisfy the same lower bound as that given in Theorem 4.
The opportunity to purchase speculatively in the auction and then resell in the secondary market changes the environment from an essentially private value auction model to a common value model. In an earlier version of this paper, we show that the upper bound implied by Theorem 5 will no longer be valid if the auction is characterized by common values. Since winner's curse effects can suppress bids in auctions, if there is a common value element to the auction due to speculative purchases, this element may explain lower than expected bids. As information is revealed over time, the average market value of an object will typically rise as the winner's curse effect is ameliorated. Both the auction itself and the passage of time between the auction and the secondary market sale could explain a further increase in such information. Nevertheless, if this is the explanation for the difference, it is interesting that bid suppression due to common value effects accounts for a secondary market premium as high as 26 percent.
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The extension to allow speculative purchases, as well as the original model, restrict bidders to submitting constant per unit bids and to bidding for similar quantities. The result is a strong symmetry in the model. Without symmetry, there are theoretical reasons to suspect that the ability to submit multiple unit bids may be responsible for low auction prices. Ausubel and Cramton (1996) show that for many multiple-object auctions, whenever there are bidders with elastic demands for varying quantities, then equilibrium behavior must involve what they call "demand reduction". Bidders submit something other than their true demand curves for the goods in order to induce a lower overall payment. An informal measure of demand reduction behavior can be conducted simply by seeing how often marginal bidders also submitted higher bids. Over the years 1988 to 1990, bidders who won at the marginal bid also submit higher bids 27 percent of the time implying that they were able to acquire the identical object at different prices.
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The possibility of demand reduction is important because the phenomenon is not simply a consequence of our inability to model auctions in which bidders submit demand schedules. The same effect is equally possible in institutions where many single object auctions are held but which attract bidders with differing demand curves. The only difference in those cases is the multiple unit demand on the part of the bidders is hidden by their participation in the many separate auctions which are held. Thus, the OCS oil auctions examined by Hendricks, Porter and Boudreau (1987) and the eggplant auctions examined by Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) may be vulnerable to exactly the same demand reduction behavior even though bidders can submit bids in a given auction for only single units. It is, therefore, worth investigating the role of multiunit bidding more deeply.
In New Zealand, the actual auction institution deviated from our theoretical model in two conceptually distinct ways. First, bidders did not have to submit bids for identical quantities. Second, bidders could also submit multiple bids at different prices. Ausubel and Cramton (1996) suggest that either deviation could matter.
We examined the importance of deviations from identical quantity bids indirectly by constructing two different measures of how much a given auction violated the identical unit demand assumption: i) a simple variance of quantities demanded across bids in an auction; and ii) a Gini coefficient from the list of bids submitted. These were computed for auctions for which secondary market data was available. Summary statistics for the bid Ginis are reported in Tables 3 and 4 . The second way the actual institution deviated from the theoretical game was that bidders were allowed to submit many bids. A simple measure of the single bid assumption was constructed by dividing the total number of bids in a given auction by the total number of different bidders.
These variables' summary statistics are given in Tables 3 and 4 .
The upper bound that is derived from Theorem 5 requires the assumption that initial signals be informative enough about the final value to make resale relatively rare. Since we do not have information on all secondary market sales, we do not know how rare these transactions were. However, as Tables 3 and 4 suggest, Mertz, a major reseller, still sold a relatively small proportion of total quotas that were auctioned.
Furthermore, Theorem 5 suggests that the upper bound will be less likely to hold the less informative is the initial signal. We constructed a proxy to measure the informativeness of the signal which is the proportion of the total quantity sold at auction which later sold (by Mertz) on the aftermarket (the variable, "ratio").
Assuming that Mertz's frequency of resale is correlated with the total number of resales overall, we can presume that the higher this figure is, the less accurate (ex post) were the initial signals that determined bids.
We regressed the difference between the average discounted secondary market price and B on "ratio". We also included the number of secondary market transactions to see if there was some unexplained selection bias that creates a systematic relationship between the frequency of aftermarket sales and the aftermarket premium. The results of this regression including some "demand reduction" variables are reported in Table 7 . In virtually all specifications, the estimated coefficient of "ratio" is significant but negative. This seems to argue against the conjecture that a failure of (C5) is to blame. The more frequent the secondary market transactions, the more important is the common value component that is introduced by the aftermarket. This should make the auction environment less likely to be close to the limit in (C5) and make the difference between secondary market prices and bids larger, not smaller. The reversal of the expected direction of this effect may indicate that the secondary market is, in fact, quite non-competitive. The higher the relative demand on the aftermarket, the higher the price that is commanded by brokers in this market. No other variables were consistently significant although the ratio of bidders to bids, a bid reduction variable was significant in some specifications.
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Could other factors be at play as well? While we cannot rule them out definitively, some informal arguments can be made against other explanations. An important simplifying assumption in the theory was our modification of Haile's (1995 Haile's ( ,1996 model describing the secondary market transactions. However, Haile
shows that when asymmetric information affects the secondary market trades, bids rise at the auction phase.
If this effect is indeed present, we expect it should make it easier to find secondary market prices below the auction prices.
Could transactions costs in the secondary markets introduce selection effects that may bias the trading prices we observe? The effect of transactions costs on the data will depend on whether the price that is actually observed is inclusive or exclusive of these costs. Transactions costs operate in a manner similar to a tax. They lower the secondary market sell price and increase the secondary market buy price. The first effect is a selection effect in that only if the value of the potential seller is sufficiently low enough relative to the potential buyer will a sale take place. If the price that we observe is exclusive of these transactions costs, then the expected secondary market sale price will be lower than predicted by Theorems 4 and 5 and, therefore, reinforce the conclusions drawn from the rejection of the hypothesis. If the price we observe includes all transactions costs, then the observed price will be higher than predicted but, because of the selection effect it will not rise by as much as the transactions costs. This latter effect is analogous to the well-known result that in a market with an upward sloping supply curve, the purchase price rises less than one for one in response to the imposition of a tax. We do not have enough information to determine whether the price is inclusive or exclusive of transactions costs or, equivalently, whether we are observing a buy price or a sell price. The application of discounting already attempts to account for an obvious source of a transactions cost that is borne by the seller.
Aside from that cost, though, we do not find strong arguments one way or the other that would allow us to conclude that this effect is responsible for the significant difference between the secondary market prices and the auction prices.
A further potential complication was the fact that the New Zealand government used low prices at auction as a criterion for removing quota restrictions. This introduces an additional, strategic complication since domestic producers would have an incentive to bid up auction prices to forestall trade liberalization.
Again, if present, this effect should be to bias bids in the auctions upwards. Since our data suggests that bids are lower than expected, this effect only reinforces our conclusions.
The simplest explanation is that the secondary prices are not true tariff-equivalents. A combination of speculative purchases at the auction by brokers and subsequent monopolistic pricing in the event of high aftermarket demand may have biased the secondary market prices upward. The negative effect of the ratio variable on the difference between secondary market prices and auction prices may support this interpretation.
However, while this provides an immediate explanation for the failure of auction prices to track secondary market prices, puzzles remain. What prevented the price differences from being arbitraged away? Entry into the quota auctions was quite unrestricted. The auctions appeared to provide a far lower cost alternative to purchasing on the secondary market and incurring this high cost alternative.
Conclusions
For a policy maker who is concerned that tariffication not raise the level of protection, the results of this paper suggest that auction data may offer a useful lower bound on the tariff equivalent of a quota. We provide theoretical lower bounds that are supported empirically. The empirical and theoretical results also suggest that reliable upper bounds may be difficult to obtain. There are theoretical reasons to believe that more complicated multi-unit preferences that bidders exhibit for quota licenses are likely to exhibit may bias bids downwards and the presence of active aftermarkets for the products may do so as well. However, the data from the New Zealand auctions suggests that skepticism is warranted about the informational value of aftermarket prices as well.
Appendix A
This appendix contains the proofs of theorems in the text.
Proof of Theorem 1:
By definition of w(C,C) and the assumption that densities are non-atomistic,
Furthermore, by affiliation,
Finally,
The equality stems from the fact that we are conditioning on the true state. Similarly,
QED
Proof of Theorem 2: Fix a bidder, i. Let V (j) denote the j th order statistic of the (n-1) U's excluding bidder i.
Note that Y (q) is generally jointly distributed with V (j+1) and V (j) but by assumption is independent of X i . Suppose that B q (C) is a strictly monotonic, symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy. The expected utility of bidder i with signal x who submits, instead, a bid that would have been submitted by a bidder with signal x, is
To understand this expression observe that, by monotonicity, i wins whenever the q th highest of the other signals is below x and, conditional on winning at the auction, bidder i assures himself of the difference between his true value and the price to be paid for importing the good. In addition, whenever the q+1'st highest valuation of the other bidders is above his true valuation, he will trade and capture the surplus represented by the difference between his valuation and U (q+1) . If he fails to win at the auction, the possibility still remains that his final valuation is among the q highest of the bidders. By assumption, he will obtain a license and receive the surplus reflected by the difference in valuation between his value and the q th highest.
Differentiating this expression with respect to x and imposing the condition that the resulting expression be zero at x = x yields as a necessary condition of any equilibrium,
To derive the equality, note that the first term is the expected value of V (q+1) when it lies above U i times the probability that this event occurs, the next is the expected value of V (q) when it lies below U i times the probability that this event occurs and the last is the expected value of U i when it is the q+1'st highest valuation times the probability of that event. All of these condition on the q th highest signal of the other bidders being x and the signal of i being x. This is the expected value of the q+1'st valuation conditional on X i = x and Y q =
x. Solving this first order differential equation yields the expression for the bidding function. The monotonicity of w (x,x) implies that the condition is sufficient as well. QED Proof of Theorem 3: Let G(C) denote the distribution function of the bidder signals, X i and g(C) be its associated density. The expected value of the sum of the top q bids is
By the independence of signals,
So, substituting the definition of B q (X)
Integrating by parts gives 
This is the first order differential equation defining the standard bidding function for an independent private values, q object auction. Revenue equivalence implies that expected revenue approaches the expected private value of the q+1'st highest license valuation, the first equality in the statement of the Theorem. Let B q-1 (x) be a bidding function in a q-1 unit auction. Applying the same argument to this auction yields,
Furthermore,
Combining these results yields the conclusions of the Theorem. QED
Appendix B
This appendix shows that allowing bidders to purchase speculatively at the auction creates commonvalue like effects in the auction that can suppress bidding behavior.
The first equation in the proof of Theorem 2 can be rewritten as (replacing Y (q) with Y (s) )
This can be written simply as
The first term is independent of x and therefore independent of the bid. The last two terms are the same as the return to a bidder with signal x, who bids as if he had signal x, who wins whenever x is higher than the s highest signals and whose only return is the payoff from selling the quota at a price equal to the q+1'st highest valuation. (That is, the bidder has no use value for the object).
Suppose that bidders can submit multiple unit bids up to a maximum of f. Let q/f = s and assume that s is a whole number. This latter assumption helps to ensure symmetry among bidders. Redefine w(C,C) such that (Y (s) ) and, in particular, wins independent of bids the same bidder submits on the other f-1 licenses.
Therefore, whether or not the bidder has a use value for the object, a necessary and sufficient condition for this bid to be optimal is that it maximize the value of (B1). Using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2, bidding according to the revised definition of B q for each object solves that maximization problem.
The remainder of the arguments in Theorems 3 and 4 remain true replacing Y (q) by Y (s) . However, Theorem 5 will no longer be applicable since C5) does not imply that the probability that U (q) <U i given Y (s) >X i will go to zero. In fact, it will generally not be zero and this lowers bids relative to the prediction in Theorem Five.
14. For a description of how these models are estimated see Greene (1990), pp.485-494. 15. We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this possibility.
16. Consider a tractable pure common value model where ex post values are the sum of signals of all n bidders' signals and the signals are independently distributed U [0, 1] . If the number of units sold is approximately one half the number of bidders (a substantial overestimate given our data) then the ratio of the true expected value to the expected auction price in a q th price auction is (2n)/(2n-1). This computation yields a liberal upper bound on the winner's curse effect and would imply a premium of more than 20% only if the expected number of bidders is 3 or fewer.
17. A referee observed that if demand reduction is occurring, bidders who submitted some high bids in the auction together with other low bids, might seek to acquire additional units through the secondary market. Unfortunately, our data set does not allow us to check whether or not this is taking place since we cannot compare secondary market trades with bidders in the original auction.
18. We also ran the regression excluding the apparently anomalous category 916 but there were no significant differences. 
_______________________________________________________________________________

Note:
Column 2 is the yearly average across all auctions of the quantity weighted average winning bids for the given year. Column 3 is the yearly average of the quantity weighted average of winning bids excluding the lowest winning bid. The last two columns are the average difference and the standard deviation of the difference. (N t is the number of auctions recorded in our data set in year t.) 
